

**Marine casualty  
Safety Investigation**

**Law 4033/2011 as amended and  
applies**

(summary extract of art. 1.b, 4.1.a  
& 4.1.b)

The conduct of Safety Investigations into marine casualties or incidents is independent from criminal, discipline, administrative or civil proceedings whose purpose is to apportion blame or determine liability. The sole objective of the conduct of a safety investigation is to ascertain the circumstances that caused the marine accident or incident through analysis, to draw useful conclusions and lessons learned that may lead, if necessary, to safety recommendations or proposals addressed to parties or stakeholders involved in order to take remedial actions, aiming to prevent or avoid future marine accidents.

**Points of Interest**

- This Interim Report has been prepared by virtue of art. 16.2 Law 4033/2011, as applies (art. 14.2 Directive 2009/18/EC) as the full investigation report will not be published within 12 months of the marine accident date.
- The Interim Report has been published for the sole purposes of the safety investigation process with no litigation in mind and should be inadmissible to any judicial or other proceedings (administrative, disciplinary, criminal or civil) whose purpose is to attribute or apportion blame or liability.
- The Interim Report only aims to present a concise summary of the events occurred on the 19<sup>th</sup> of August 2020 that led to a serious marine casualty
- The Interim Report does not constitute legal advice in any way and should not be construed as such.

**Very serious marine casualty**

**August 2021**

HBMCI conducts the safety investigation of issued marine casualty. The content of this Interim Report is based on current available information and data collected and analyzed during the safety investigation process into captioned marine casualty. The completion of the procedure as defined in relevant legislation may reveal or identify new information, data or evidence and consequently cause changes or amendments in data provided by this Interim Report. All times mentioned are Ship's time (UTC+4).

**«B/C FANEROMENI»**

«FANEROMENI», is a 50,177 gross tonnage Bulk Carrier vessel under Greek Flag. She was built in 2007 by Sungdong Shipyards in Korea. During the time of the marine casualty the vessel was sailing in the Arabic sea, in ballast condition with a crew compliment of 18 (5 Greek nationals and 13 Philippine nationals), en route from Fujairah, UAE to Port Elizabeth, South Africa.

**Marine Accident Synopsis**

On August 19th, 2020 at 04:43 ship's time (UTC 00:43) a fire broke out inside the Engine room of B/C FANEROMENI, while she was underway in position, Lat: 11° 01' N Long: 060° 40' E, approximately 380 n.m E off Socotra Island in Arabian Sea. By that time, while the Chief Officer was on the Watch, the fire alarm was activated and he immediately reported the emergency to the Master. The Master came rapidly on the bridge and made the emergency announcement through the Public Address System in order to summon the crew to the starboard Muster station at A' Deck (embarkation deck). The Chief Officer proceeded to the Muster station and counted the summoned crew. The Master instructed the Chief Engineer who had already proceeded to the Engine Room, to activate the quick closing valves in order to cut off the fuel and lub oil supply. He also ordered crew members to close the fire doors and air vents of the Engine room and then to evacuate the area. The Chief Engineer spotted the Second and the Third Engineer trying to extinguish the fire by using the nearby portable fire extinguishers and ordered them to evacuate the area.

As reported at 04:55 ship's time the main power system of FANEROMENI was lost and a black out occurred. Following the engine room evacuation all crew gathered at the Muster station. The Chief Officer reported to the Master that the Second and Third Engineer were missing and could not be found. He was immediately ordered to prepare the fire squad in order to enter in the Engine Room and to search for the two missing crew members as well as to try to combat the fire. The support medical team was also prepared to administer first aid treatment, if required. As the emergency teams proceeded to the entrance of the engine room through the alleyway of the upper deck they saw the Third Engineer coming out from the engine room. His condition was reported to be bad as he was breathing heavily and was about to faint. He had also sustained burn injuries on his hands. While the support medical team administered first aid to the Third Engineer, the fire squad entered the engine room. However they did not manage to find the missing Second Engineer. The Chief Officer, leader of the Squad, reported to the Master that the fire was located at No 3 Generator and had spread at the adjacent area and equipment and could not be extinguished, due to the high temperatures, heavy smoke and flames that hindered their firefighting efforts.

The Master, taking into account that the Second Engineer was not found and taking into account the safety of the crew and the vessel, decided to activate the fixed fire extinguishing system (CO2), as he was concerned that there was an imminent danger for the fuel tanks to explode due to the high thermal load developed in the engine room. At approximately 05:20 the CO2 system was activated and the fire was extinguished. At 06:30 the Master ordered the fire squad to enter in the engine room and search for the missing crew member. At 06:45 the Second Engineer was found in the Engine control room with no vital signs. The fire had caused damages to critical equipment and wiring. The engine crew carried out repairs and power loss was restored. However Faneromeni remained not under command as propulsion was not operating. The engine crew managed to partially repair damages and propulsion and maneuverability were restored on 2 September 2020. M/V Faneromeni sailed to Dubai Anchorage to undergo permanent repairs by operating the Main Engine & No. 1 Auxiliary Diesel Generator.

**Origin of the fire:** The safety investigation analysis is focusing on a fuel leakage in No. 3 Auxiliary Diesel Generator, originating from the fuel filter's inlet air vent (Figure 2). It is presumed that due to the leakage diesel fuel was sprayed on the hot surfaces of the generator causing the fire ignition that was spread rapidly to the adjacent area and nearby to components and equipment. The maintenance of the generator's fuel system is under thorough examination to identify the causes of the fuel leakage.

**Investigation**

An analysis of the gathered evidence is being carried out, in order to determine the circumstances and the contributing factors that led to the examined very serious marine casualty.

Such factors include the failure of engine crew members to follow Rules, Regulations and established safety emergency procedures on board for fire fighting and evacuation and others as will be analyzed in the safety investigation report.

**Final safety Investigation Report**

A draft safety Investigation report is under preparation and when finalized will be circulated to involved and interested parties for consultation.



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## FACTUAL INFORMATION

### SHIPS PARTICULARS

Name	FANEROMENI
Flag	GREEK
Port and number of Registry	Piraeus 11613
Ship's type	Bulk carrier
IMO	9343857
Call sign	SVKG
LOA	222,41 m
Breadth	36,92 m
Year of built	2007
Shipyard	Sungdong Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, Korea
Construction	Steel
Gross Tonnage	50177 Tons
Net Tonnage	30679 Tons
Engine / Power	1 X Internal Combustion Engine/ STX Engine/1X11060 KW
Classification Society	CCS
Minimum Safe Manning	12

### Voyage Particulars

Last port of call	Fujairah/UAE
Trading Area	International Voyages
Cargo on board	Ballast condition
Crew on board	18

### Marine Casualty Information

Date & time	19/08/2021 at 04:43 ship's time (UTC 00:43)
Type of marine casualty	Very serious marine casualty
Weather & environmental conditions	Daylight, SW DIRECTION 6BF , 3,0 m SWELL
Location of casualty	Lat: 11° 01' N Long: 060° 40' E
Damages to ship	Indicatively: Aux. generators No.2 & No.3, Boiler, Incinerator, electrical cables etc.
Fatalities / injuries / pollution	One (01)/one (01) /none



Figure 1: B/C FANEROMENI



Figure 2: Fuel filters of No.3 Generator